Debtor\u27s and Creditor\u27s Rights--Attachment and Garnishment--Constitutional Parameters of Prejudgment Remedies by Pezzulli, Michael Frank
Volume 78 | Issue 1 Article 6
December 1975




West Virginia University College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons
This Student Note is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for
inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact
ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael F. Pezzulli, Debtor's and Creditor's Rights--Attachment and Garnishment--Constitutional Parameters of Prejudgment Remedies, 78





PARAMETERS OF PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The creditor's use of prejudgment remedies is deeply rooted in
Anglo American history.' The actions of "replevin and detinue
were devised to afford the remedy of a specific recovery of the
chattels in question . *."..2 Replevin was premised on the theory
that the recovery, prior to judgment, of a chattel unlawfully taken
was justified.3 Although the theoretical foundation of detinue was
similar to that of replevin, it dealt not with an unlawful taking, but
with "unlawful detention of the property."' The technical distinc-
tion between the two actions eventually diminished in importance5
and replevin became the dominant action utilized by persons at-
tempting to obtain a prejudgment acquisition of chattel.
I See 3 W. HoLDswoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 281-83 (3d ed. 1927).
2 C. KINNANE, A FIRST BOOK ON ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 624 (2d ed. 1952).
2 It [replevin] arose to fill a remedial need in cases where a tenant's
chattels, such as agricultural implements and live stock, used in operat-
ing his farm were seized by a landlord. The seizure was called a 'distress'
and the goods taken were said to be distrained. It is obvious that if the
seizure by the landlord was unlawful, because in fact the tenant had paid
his rent or other obligations to the lord, the tenant was placed unjustly
in a most difficult position. and would be threatened almost inevita-
bly with ruin.
In order to enable the tenant to go ahead with his farming, a new
remedy was devised so as to secure to him a return of the property even
before his right to it was established by suit. . . . [I]f the tenant did
what was required he could first get back his property and then sue to
prove that he was entitled to keep it because it had been taken from him
unlawfully. Various modifications of the action have been made in mod-
em times, but this distinctive feature still remains in our law. . . . The
point is, as in the case of the remedy in ejectment, that whatever the state
of the action itself may be, the remedy is substantially preserved. Id. at
622.
Id. at 623.
In order to illustrate the ancient technicality whereby an action
was limited to a specific kind of offense, we should notice that detinue
could be used in case of an unlawful detention, while replevin was used
in the case of an unlawful taking. Detinue, therefore, had the broader
scope of the two actions, until replevin came to be used not only for cases
of unlawful taking, but also for cases of unlawful detention, even though
the taking might have been lawful. Id. at 624.
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Prejudgment remedies were transferred to the United States
early in this country's history.6 Eventually, they, in one form or
another,' became virtually universal in the United States. 8
Before 1969 the constitutionality of replevin and self-help re-
possession statutes was rarely challenged.' Moreover, some author-
ites even concluded that the constitutionality of such statutes was
unequivocally clear.'0 Professor William D. Hawkland has sug-
gested that considerable authority existed to substantiate the
confidence many felt in the constitutionality of prejudgment at-
tachment remedies."
HI. NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE
Against this deeply entrenched doctrine the Supreme Court of
the United States has, within the last six years, launched an attack
6 "The American colonies, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
transformed the common law attachment into a provisional collection remedy,
often called domestic attachment and, in addition, transplanted the foreign attach-
ment of the English boroughs." S. RIESENFELD, CREDITOR'S REMEDIES AND DEBTOR'S
PROTECTION 177 (1967). [hereinafter cited as RIESENFELD].
' "Examples of such remedies are 'replevin', see, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § § 78.01-
10 (Supp. 1972), as well as 'claim and delivery', see, e.g. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
565.01-.11 (1974), 'detinue', see, e,g. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-586 to -595 (1957), and
'sequestration', see, e.g. LA. CODE Cw. P. arts. 3571-76 (1960)." Anderson, A Pro-
posed Solution for the Commercial World to the Sniadach-Fuentes Problem: Con-
tractual Waiver, 79 CASE & COM. 24 (1974). [hereinafter cited as Anderson].
"Generally speaking all American jurisdictions today have one or more provi-
sional collection remedies, available before judgment, there are however, considera-
ble variations in the nomenclature, the prerequisites of their availability, and in
the method of their prosecution." RESENFELD, supra note 6, at 180. See Anderson,
supra note 7, at 24, for a complete listing of the specific state statutes dealing with
prejudgment remedies found in 48 states and the District of Columbia.
9 Note, Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.-The Repossession of Fuentes, 5 MEM. ST.
U.L. REV. 74, 77 (1974) [hereinafter cited as MEM. ST.].
11 Thus as late as 1967 Professor Stefan Riesenfeld, one of the leading
academic experts on Creditor's Rights, was able to state confidently that,
'Although attachment is a harsh remedy because it deprives the debtor
of his power of disposition over assets prior to the juducial ascertainment
of his liability, the constitutionality of this procedure is firmly estab-
lished.'
Hawkland, The Seed of Sniadach: Flower or Weed?, 79 CASE & CoM. 3 (1974), citing
RIESENFELD, supra note 6, at 180. [hereinafter cited as Hawkland].
" "Professor Riesenfeld had good authority for his position, namely several
decisions from the Supreme Court, particularly Ownbey v. Morgan [256 U.S. 94
(1921)], Coffin Brothers & Co. v. Bennett [277 U.S. 29 (1928)], and McInnes v.
McKay [279 U.S. 820 (1929)]." Id.
[Vol. 78
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that has struck to the very core of the concept of prejudgment
remedies. The Court has done so in four successive cases: Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp.,2 Fuentes v. Shevin,'3 Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co.," and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc."
In the first case, Mrs. Sniadach's wages were garnished as a
result of an alleged claim of $420.00 on a promissory note.'" She
argued that "the Wisconsin garnishment prodedure violates that
due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment, in that notice
and an opportunity to be heard are not given before the in rem
seizure of the wages."' 7 According to the Court, the statutory pro-
cedure 8 in Wisconsin at the time of the garnishment of Mrs. Snia-
dach's wages was clearly favorable to the creditors.'9 The Court,
using language implying that the case was to be limited to its
facts,2 held that "[t]his prejudgment garnishment procedure vio-
lates the fundamental principles of due process." 2' Justice Doug-
las, writing for the majority, cited extensively to the detrimental
sociological impact such a prejudgment procedure would have on
the individual.2" This heavy reliance on the sociological ramifica- °
tions of this type of remedy prompted Mr. Justice Black to strongly
suggest, in his dissenting opinion, that the Court was infringing
upon state legislative power.23
The reactions generated by the holding in Sniadach were var-
12 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
13 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
" 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
" 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
, 395 U.S. at 337-38.
' Id. at 338.
" Wis. STAT. ANm. § 267.07(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
"What happens in Wisconsin is that the clerk of the court issues the sum-
mons at the request of the creditor's lawyer; and it is the latter who by serving the
garnishee sets in motion the machinery whereby the wages are frozen." 395 U.S. at
338-39.
20 "We deal here with wages - a specialized type of property presenting distinct
problems in our economic system. We turn then to the nature of that property and
problems of procedural due process." Id. at 340.2 Id. at 342.
2 Id. at 340-42.
2' The arguments would .. . be appropriate for Wisconsin's legisla-
tors to make against that State's garnishment laws. But made in a Court
opinion, holding Wisconsin's laws unconstitutional, they amount to what
I believe to be a plain, judicial usurpation of state legislative power to
decide what the State's laws shall be.
Id. at 345.
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ied; 4 the general conclusion being that it served primarily to obfus-
cate the state of the law insofar as prejudgment creditor remedies
were concerned.2
In 1972, the Supreme Court took a second look at the law of
prejudgment remedies in the case of Fuentes v. Shevin.28 This case
concerned the plight of Margarita Fuentes, a Florida housewife
who purchased a gas stove and a stereophonic phonograph from
the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company under a conditional sales
contract." She had faithfully made her installment payments for
over a year, until a dispute arose between her and the Firestone
company over the servicing of her stove, at which time she stopped
payment." Firestone, subsequent to Mrs. Fuentes' default, insti-
tuted suit for the repossession of the property and simultaneously
obtained a writ of replevin that ordered the sheriff to seize the
property under dispute.29 In a 4-3 decision, 0 the Court held that,
"Prejudgment replevin provisions work a deprivation of property
without due process of law insofar as they deny the right to a prior




The effect of this decision was to expand the due process re-
quirements of notice and hearing developed in Sniadach to "any
significant property interest. ' '3 Judicial interpretations of Fuentes
furthered the view that the requirements for notice and hearing,
initially developed in Sniadach, had been greatly expanded. Al-
' "A case that may have far-reaching effects upon personal finance law ......
55 A.B.A.J. 985 (1969); "I predicted .. . Sniadach would not usher in a series of
cases that would decimate all the prejudgment remedies but would be limited
... " Hawkland, supra note 10, at 7.
2 "Predictably, the initial reaction to Sniadach was mass confusion and disa-
greement," MEM. ST., supra note 9, at 75; see also Hawkland, supra note 10, at 11.
For a discussion of the ramifications of Sniadach insofar as judicial interpretations
of the law are concerned, see Note, 76 W. VA. L. REV. 24 (1974). See also, Hawkland,
supra note 10, at 10.
26 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
v Id. at 70.
2a Id.
29 Id.
11 Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice Rehnquist did not participate; the Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun joined Mr. Justice White in dissenting.
1, 407 U.S. at 96.
32 Id. at 86.
33 Fuentes abolishes any constitutional distinction between different types of
property. Schneider v. Margossian, 349 F.Supp. 741 (D.C. Mass. 1972). In a deci-
[Vol. 78
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though the Court had apparently moved strongly in the direction
of consumer interests, it did not do so without delineating qualifi-
cations" and guidelines.3 Perhaps the most accurate conclusion
which can be drawn from this case is that it "[g]reatly limited the
manner in which a creditor could repossess or seize goods in the
hands of a defaulting debtor."3
On May 13, 1974, the Supreme Court re-evaluated its position
with regard to creditors' prejudgment remedies, and handed down
its decision in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.." "For 25 months the
commercial bar sought to clarify the breadth of the exceptions
alluded to in Fuentes and finally the clarification came . ... "I'
The W.T. Grant Company, pursuant to Louisiana procedure, filed
suit in the First City Court of New Orleans against Lawrence
Mitchell, alleging the sale of various appliances and demanding
sion striking down pre-judgment real estate attachments, the Court noted that
Fuentes removed any doubt that the protection of the 14th amendment applies to
any significant property interest. Bay State Harness Horse R. and B. Ass'n v. PPG
Industries, Inc. 365 F. Supp. 1299 (D. Mass. 1973). "The due process clause...
requires an opportunity for a hearing after due notice before a person is deprived
of any significant property interest, except in very unusual circumstances." Lynch
v. Household Finance Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720, 723 (D. Conn. 1973) (striking down
the Connecticut pre-judgment attachment and garnishment statute).
1, "There are 'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and op-
portunity for a hearing. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. at 379. [The relevant
portion of Boddie is "except for extraordinary situations where some valid
governmental interest is at stake that justifies postponing the hearing until after
the event." (emphasis added) Boddie v Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)].
These situations, however, must be truly unusual." 407 U.S. at 90. The importance
of this statement is further explicated in a note by the Court which suggests that
extraordinary situations may be limited to such instances as protection of the
public good [Coffin Bros. & Co. v. Bennett, 277 U.S. 29 (1928) - a bank failure]
and to secure jurisdiction in state court - "clearly a most basic and important public
interest." [Ownby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1924)]. 407 U.S. at 91 n.23. Of signifi-
cance is the fact that, although governmental and public interests are included
within the exceptions, creditor's rights are not so clearly included.
11 The guidelines delineated in Fuentes are:
First ... the seizure has to be directly necessary to secure an important
governmental or general public interest. Second, there has been a special
need for very prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over
its monoply of legitimate force. The person initiating the seizure has been
a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of
a narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in this
particular instance. 407 U.S. at 91.
11 Comment, 38 ALBANY L. REv. 467 (1974).
3' 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
s' Recent Decisions, 63 ILL. B.J. 212 (1974).
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judgment against him for the unpaid balance of the purchase
price. As a further allegation, W.T. Grant suggested that it had a
vendor's lien on the goods and that a writ of sequestration should
issue pending the outcome of the suit. An accompanying affidavit
swore to the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint and asserted
that W.T. Grant had reason to believe the debtor would "encum-
ber, alienate or otherwise dispose of the merchandise . . .
Premised upon the petition and affidavit, without either prior no-
tice to Mitchell or affording him an opportunity for a hearing, the
judge ordered the constable to take into his possession the mer-
chandise described in the petition upon the plaintiff furnishing
bond for double the amount claimed. Mitchell thereafter moved to
dissolve the writ on the grounds that it had issued without prior
notice and opportunity for him to defend his right to possession of
the property. The motion was denied and the Supreme Court of
Louisiana refused to disturb the ruling." On a writ of certiorari the
Supreme Court affirmed the lower ruling holding that Louisiana's
sequestration procedure, allowing a creditor to obtain a writ upon
an ex parte application without notice or opportunity for a hearing,
is constitutional, and does not violate the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.'
The Court in Mitchell attempted to distinguish Fuentes pri-
marily by suggesting that a judge, rather than a clerk, issued the
writ.42 It also attempted to distinguish Fuentes on two other
grounds: "the creditor in Mitchell was required by local law to
allege 'specific facts' justifying sequestration . . .[and] the issues
that governed the plaintiff's right to sequestration were limited to
the existence of a vendor's lien and a default under the sales con-
tract."43 These items of distinction between Fuentes and Mitchell
have been severely criticized. As Mr. Justice Stewart stated in his
dissent, "The Court's opinion in Fuentes . . .explicitly rejected
each of these factors as a ground for a difference in decision."44
3' 416 U.S. at 602.
, 263 La. 627, 269 So. 2d 186 (1972).
" 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
12 "[Iun the parish where this case arose, the requisite showing must be made
to a judge, and judicial authorization obtained." 416 U.S. at 616.
' Recent Decisions, 63 ILL. B.J. 212 (1974).
' 416 U.S. at 631. Additionally, the court said:
[I]t appears that under Louisiana law the affidavits need only be conclu-
sory submissions by an interested party. Since the creditor himself initi-
ates the procedure, there is no initial check on misuse of the sequestration
[Vol. 78
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Considerable opinion existed to support Mr. Justice Stewart's con-
clusion that Mitchell had, in effect, overruled Fuentes." Perhaps
the most reasonable conclusion arising out of the uproar subse-
quent to Mitchell was that:
The absolute rule of Fuentes has been abandoned in favor of a
balancing test which 'protects the debtor's interest in every
conceivable way except in allowing him to have the property to
start with, and this is done in pursuit of what we deem an
acceptable arrangement pendente lite to put the property in the
possession of the party who furnishes protection against loss or
damage to the other pending trial on the merits.'40
In North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.," the Su-
preme Court has seen fit to review for a fourth time the issue of
creditor's prejudgment remedies. By a majority decision," the
Court has sought to provide the country with a definitive rule in
this troubled area of the law.
In August of 1971, respondent filed suit against petitioner al-
leging an indebtedness due and owing for goods sold and delivered
in the amount of $51,279.17.11 Respondent simultaneously filed
affidavit and bond for process of garnishment, naming the First
National Bank of Dalton as garnishee. The affidavit merely as-
serted that the debt was in existence and that the affiant feared
the loss of the goods. Based on this evidence, the clerk of the
devise such as exists where requests for ex parte action are initiated by
neutral government officials. Furthermore, judicial supervision under the
Louisiana procedure is a weak and undemanding check; the judicial func-
tion appears to be virtually ministerial once the creditor submits his
affidavit in proper form.
The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 79 (1974). [hereinafter
referred to as HARV. L. REV.].
11 "[T]he principle of Fuentes has succumbed in Mitchell." HARv. L. REV.,
supra note 43, at 83. "It is evident that Mitchell, at least tacitly, has overruled
Fuentes in part." MEM. ST., supra note 9, at 87; "Each of these three points of
difference between Fuentes and Mitchell is minor and of questionable importance."
Recent Decisions, 63 ILL. B.J. 212 (1974).
" MEM. ST., supra note 9, at 87 (citing 94 S. Ct. at 1905).
47 95 S. Ct. 719 (1975).
40 Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court. Mr. Justice Stewart
filed concurring opinion. Mr. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment and filed
opinion. Mr. Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice
Rehnquist joined, and Mr. Chief Justice Burger joined in part.
" 95 S. Ct. at 721.
' Id.
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superior court issued a summons of garnishment to the bank. Peti-
tioner moved to dismiss, including within his motion "that the
garnishment procedure was unconstitutional in that it violated
'defendant's due process and equal protection rights'. . . .-5 The
Georgia Supreme Court denied petitioner's motion and held the
statutory garnishment procedure52 was constitutional. The
Supreme Court reversed holding the statute unconstitutional.
The element of paramount importance in the Court's decision
was that the Court distinguished Mitchell from Fuentes, thereby
vitiating any speculation that Mitchell had, in effect, overruled
Fuentes. The Court distinguished the two cases on the grounds
that in Mitchell:
The writ ... was issuable only by a judge upon the finding of
an affidavit going beyond mere conclusory allegations and
clearly setting out the facts entitling the creditor to
sequestration. The Louisiana law also expressly entitled the
debtor to an immediate hearing after seizure and to dissolution
of the writ absent proof by the creditor of the grounds on which
the writ was issued. (emphasis added) "'
The opinions of the concurring justices seem to indicate the
impact of the instant opinion. From this decision it is clear that
state statutory procedures neglecting to cover due process consid-
erations need to be carefully scrutinized. The Court is apparently
serving notice to states having prejudgment remedies55 that unless
the states follow the Mitchell exception,56 their statutes will fall
under the rule of Fuentes and be held unconstitutional.
Im. REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
West Virginia is one such state having prejudgment creditor's
remedies. Judicial interpretations of challenged prejudgment rem-
edies in West Virginia have elucidated contradictory views of the
, Id.
52 GA. CODE ANN. § 46-101 (1966).
95 S. Ct. at 722.
5' Mr. Justice Stewart stated:
"It is gratifying to note that my report of the demise of Fuentes v. Shevin...
seems to have been greatly exaggerated." Id. Mr. Justice Powell stated: "The
Court's opinion in this case, relying substantially on Fuentes, suggests that that
decision will again be read as calling into question much of the previously settled
law governing commercial transaction." Id.
53 See Anderson, supra note 7, at 24.
51 See supra note 52, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 78
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law. Early decisions in West Virginia followed the generally ac-
cepted rule that such statutory provisions were not violative of the
constitution." This position has recently been repudiated by the
various courts of West Virginia."
In Payne v. Walden,5 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, overruling Byrd v. Rector,"' held that the West Virginia
distress for rent statute6' violated due process in that it, "does not
provide the tenant notice or the opportunity to be heard in defense
before his property is distrained upon. . ". ."I The court in Payne
looked to a historical analysis of the distress for rent statutes and
concluded that judicial scrutiny was applicable to the extent that
this type of action now involves state officials, and has now been
codified.63 Finally, the concluding statement of the court is signifi-
cant in that it apparently limits the decision to its facts while
simultaneously giving notice to the legislature that similar statu-
tory provisions may also be ruled unconstitutional.64
11 [A] defendant is not deprived of his property by reason of the levy
of a copy of the attachment upon a person who is indebted to him or who
has effects in his custody belonging to the defendant .... there has been
no deprivation of property. The attachment, quasi in rem in nature, has
operated only to detain the property temporarily, to await final judgment
on the merits of plaintiff's claim. No constitutional right is impaired.
Byrd v. Rector, 112 W. Va. 192, 198, 163 S.E. 845, 848 (1932), overruled, 190 S.E.2d
770 (W. Va. 1972).
18 See Note 76 W. VA. L. REV. 24 (1974).
59 190 S.E.2d 770 (W. Va. 1972).
CO 112 W. Va. 192, 163 S.E. 845 (1932), see supra note 57.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 37-6-12 (1966).
62 190 S.E.2d at 777.
13 "[l]t is now apparent that codification has accorded this procedure both the
dignity and responsibility of a judicial proceeding." Id.
do Our holding goes no further. Though the reasoning applied here
may be applicable also to other summary civil remedies, we must be, and
are, aware that a considerable body of statute and case procedure regulat-
ing various creditor-debtor relationships is an integral part of the subsist-
ing law of this state. It represents legislative direction, wisdom and pre-
rogative which will not be disturbed by this court unless a particular and
precise question is presented and compelling reason exists therefor.
Id. at 779. Of interest is the fact that the above decision, Payne, was cited by the
same court in the case of In re Willis, 207 S.E.2d 129 (W. Va. 1974), in invalidating
the taking away of a child from its natural parents by the Welfare Department in
a child neglect proceeding: "One of the basic constitutional guarantees of due
process is, of course, that no one shall be deprived of a substantial right by an arm
of the state without notice and the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner.
See State ex rel. Payne v. Walden. . . ." 207 S.E.2d at 138.
9
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The view taken by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals with regard to distress for rent statutes was also adopted by
the United States District Court for the Southern District of West
Virginia in Shaffer v. Holbrook.5 The District Court, citing to
Sniadach" and Fuentes,7 held that "The complete absence of an
opportunity to be heard prior toseizure deprives the West Virginia
tenant of his property without due process of law. . . ."I' Of major
significance is the comment by the court that the use of the justice
of the peace is not significant enough to validate the constitution-
ality of the distress for rent statute."
The holding in Shaffer, while constitutionally sound, may be
subject to modification to the extent that the court dismissed the
justice of the peace as a valid arbiter of the issue of the reasonable-
ness of the seizure. Recent modifications in West Virginia law
concerning justices of the peace" have moved that office closer into
the realm of the judiciary and away from the function of acting as
an administrative body. For these reasons the Shaffer decision, as
it relates to justices of the peace, may no longer be valid.
The district court also moved to broaden the category of pre-
judgment remedies subjected to due process considerations in
Straley v. Gassaway Motor Company, Inc..7 This case invalidated
a type of improver's lien,"2 specifically, a repairman's lien. The
court, citing to Shaffer, concluded that "the West Virginia repair-
man's lien enforcement procedures are less satisfying of due pro-
cess requirements than were the invalidated landlord's distress
procedures."73 Finally, classifying repairman's liens as unconstitu-
"346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D. W. Va. 1972).
" Id. at 764.
, Id. at 765.
" Id. at 766.
" The presence of the justice of the peace in the West Virginia proce-
dural patterns is a distinction of no difference. When issuing the distress
warrant, the justice of the peace is performing a nonjudicial act similar
to the Pennsylvania prothonotary, and his magisterial imprimatur on the
warrant does nothing to ameliorate the unconstitutional seizure of prop-
erty.
Id.
70 See State ex rel. Shrewsbury v. Poteet, 202 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 1974). Fur-
thermore, the recently passed "Judicial Reform Amendment" may also provide an
impetus for the modification of the court's opinion in Shaffer.
11 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. W. Va. 1973).
72 W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-11-3, 14 (1966).
11 359 F. Supp. at 905.
[Vol. 78
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tional, the court suggested heavily that this case would be limited
to its facts.7"
Assuming, arguendo, that Straley will be limited to its facts,
this alone does not justify ignoring the major implication of the
case. The significance of the case lies in the area of the law sub-
jected to due process scrutiny. The fourteenth amendment and its
due process considerations have generally been limited to depriva-
tion of rights as a result of state action. 75 The court, in invalidating
the repairman's lien, admitted that state action was non-existent. 78
The whole spectrum of "Miscellaneous Liens and Pledges"7 7 within
West Virginia does not require state action for its effectuation, and
hence could also be subject to judicial review. Of particular signifi-
cance is the improver's lien,7 within which the repairman's lien
was included. This statutory provision, broad in coverage, 7" is sus-
pect not only as a result of the general inclusion within such non-
state action judicial liens subject to due process scrutiny, but also
to the extent that this was the statute under which repairman's
liens were invalidated. The conclusion to be drawn is that Miscel-
laneous Liens and Pledges may, en bloc, be invalidated as lacking
in due process safeguards regardless of the lack of state action.
One area of the law projected to be possibly free of inclusion
within the above mentioned constraints was the area of attach-
ment. 0 This projection was vitiated somewhat when, in 1974, the
district court declared, in Union Barge Line Corp. v. Marble Cliff
" The statutes at supra note 73 were declared unconstitutional "in the context
of and applied in this action. . . ." Id. at 906.
11 For an analysis of the concept of "state action", see Note, 76 W. VA. L. Rv.
24, 28 (1974).
78 "The repairman already has the lien afflicted personal property in his pos-
session. He is not required to make an affidavit, arrange bond security or institute
an action. He is authorized to give written notice, to advertize, and to sell at
auction." 359 F. Supp. at 905.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-11-1 to -17 (1966).
7s W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-11-3 (1966).
" "A person who, while in possession thereof, makes, alters, repairs,
stores, transports, or in any way enhances the value of an article of per-
sonal property, or boards, pastures, feeds, trains, improves or transports
any animal, shall have a lien upon such article or animal while lawfully
in the possession thereof ......
Id.
so "[Alttachment liens may not fall victim to the requirements of procedural
due process." Note, 74 W. VA. L. REv. 24, 33 (1974).
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Quarries Co.,1 that the prejudgment garnishment statute" was
invalid as being violative of due process. The court, in invalidating
it, analyzed the general method of attachment in West Virginia83
and concluded that the method by which an attachment may
issue84 does not satisfy all of the requirements stipulated in
Fuentes." The court, in a footnote,8 served notice upon the legisla-
tors of West Virginia to adhere to the constraints of due process in
this area of the law and suggested a method to achieve this goal. T
Union Barge and the Supreme Court decisions subsequent to
Fuentes"5 call into question the validity of yet another area of West
Virginia law relating to prejudgment seizure, the detinue provi-
sions of the Code. 9 These provisions are not only vulnerable to
attack on the ground of a lack of notice and hearing, but also to
, 374 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. W. Va. 1974).
52 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-7-15 (1966).
To obtain garnishment in this state a 'plaintiff in attachment'
need only append an endorsement to the order of attachment designating
the person liable to the debtor or in possession of his property. In a typical
case, plaintiff files with [the] Clerk of the Court an affidavit setting
forth one or more of the grounds enumerated in the statute. The endorse-
ment is attached, and the order is served on the stakeholder by the
sheriff, or in this case the United States Marshal.
374 F. Supp. at 836-37.
' W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 38-7-2 (1966).
The specific grounds delineated in W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 38-7-2
(1966) could be said to satisfy the first two factors suggested by the Court
in Fuentes. Conspicuously absent from West Virginia's statutory scheme,
however, is any provision satisfying the third factor. [See Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. at 93]....
... Although the clerk of the court may examine the affidavit to
determine if any of the statutory grounds have been included, there is no
procedure for prior evaluation of the probable validity of the claim.
374 F. Supp. at 840.
11 Id. at n.12.
81 It is of course, for the legislature of West Virginia to enact legisla-
tion that satisfies the requirements of due process. In that regard, Profes-
sor William D. Hawkland has proposed a 'Model Notice and Hearing for
Provisional Remedies Act' in conjunction with the Commercial Law
League of America. The Model Act provides essentially that prejudgment
seizure of property will be allowed only on court order and only after a
hearing to determine the probable validity of the claim.
Id. For an analysis of Professor Hawkland's Model Act, see Note, 76 W. VA. L. Rav.
24, 36 (1974).
See notes 37 to 54 supra, and accompanying text.
s' W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-6-1 to 7 (1966).
[Vol. 78
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the extent that the clerk of the court may issue the writ."0 In all
probability, the detinue scheme of West Virginia will, upon appro-
priate challenge, be invalidated as a result of these constitutional
infirmities. The courts have provided clear notice that prejudg-
ment statutory provisions not providing adequate procedural
methods will be invalidated.
A final area of major concern surrounds the Uniform Commer-
cial Code and its self-help repossession provisions." "Self-help re-
possession, in contrast to replevin, allows the seller to recover
goods on default of the buyer without resort to the judicial process
so long as the repossession is peacefully conducted."92 The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Cook v. Lilly93 recently ad-
dressed itself to the concept of self-help repossession. The court
held that under the repossession provisions,94 "sufficient state ac-
tion does not exist to bring the relators within the protection of the
Fourteenth Amendment."95 The court went on to say that even if
state action existed, "the self help provisions under challenge are
sufficiently fair to all parties to withstand fourteenth amendment
scrutiny under the rule enunciated in Mitchell."'9 Interestingly
enough, the court suggested that Mitchell had, in effect, negated
Fuentes and had replaced its rule with that of a balancing test. 7
This has not borne out to be valid in light of Di-Chem.'9
Of major significance is the conflict embodied in West Vir-
ginia law as a result of Cook. The court suggested that the lack of
state action removed the action from due process protection. This
position is in direct conflict with the ruling in Straley"9 that the
repairmen's lien in West Virginia was subject to due process con-
siderations regardless of the lack of state action.'
Since neither require state action to any significant degree,
one has difficulty understanding why the miscellaneous lien
,W W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-6-1 (1966).
" UNIFORMz COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-503 and 9-504. In West Virginia: W. VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-9-503, 504 (1966).
" MEM. ST., supra note 9, at 76.
" 208 S.E.2d 784 (W. Va. 1974).
" See note 92 supra.
" 208 S.E.2d at 786.
I !d.
'7 Id.
" See infra notes 46 to 55, and accompanying text.
" See note 70 infra and accompanying text.
"00 See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
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scheme'0' has, in part, been declared invalid while the Uniform
Commercial Code's self-help repossession statute' ° has been de-
clared constitutionally permissible. One possible distinction be-
tween the two could concern the requirement in self help reposses-
sion to take possession if it can be done without a breach of the
peace. The courts may well find this to be a distinction without a
difference.
IV. CONCLUSION
Prejudgment remedies, having withstood the test of time,
have finally begun to crumble before the courts. The United States
Supreme Court in Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and Di-Chem has
set the general standards for prejudgment remedies. These stan-
dards include the requirements of notice and hearing by an impar-
tial third party, with such third party being, under most circum-
stances, a judge. The West Virginia federal courts have followed
the United States Supreme Court in Shaffer, Straley, and Union
Barge, but the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has not
consistently followed those same edicts. In Payne, the West Vir-
ginia court appeared to be in full accord with the United States
Supreme Court and the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, but in Cook it seems to have retreated
from strict compliance with the procedural due process require-
ments of the fourteenth amendment.
Clearly, the trend of the courts today is to impose the proce-
dural constraints of due process upon any form of prejudgment
creditor's remedies. The time has come for the legislature of West
Virginia, as for all state legislatures, to recognize the notice pro-
vided them by the courts and to incorporate due process safeguards
into those yet unchallenged prejudgment creditor's remedies.' 3
Michael Frank Pezzulli
'0' W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38-11-1 to -17 (1966).
'2 W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-9-503, 504 (1966).
' The author naturally assumes all responsibility for factual and judgmental
errors within this article, but would like to express his deep felt gratitude to The
Honorable John T. Copenhaver, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge of the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, for the helpful instruction
and thought that aided greatly in the preparation of this article.
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